DEE WILSON CONSULTING

Part one of a new series

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This article on the Iroquois Confederacy is the first in a series, "Unity and fragmentation in tribes, nations and empires." The theme of this series is that all political entities are shaped by factors that contribute to unity or lead to division and fragmentation. Furthermore, factors that unify or fragment societies of all sizes and description are in dynamic tension, i.e., increasing unity will eventually lead to fragmentation and vice versa.

 

The dynamic of unity vs. fragmentation has been brilliantly developed by Jonathan Schrader in his book, "Iroquois Confederacy's Experiences with Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces" (2007). Schrader asserts: "Every society has forces within that either bind it together or tear it apart. The centripetal (integrative) and centrifugal (dispersive) forces act as influences that ultimately determine the path a nation or state decides to select." (pp. 3-4) Schrader refers to a nation or alliance's center of gravity (CoG), which he defines from the US and NATO definition: "Those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight." And: "The Iroquois peoples’ primary CoG centered on its national identity and purpose manifested through the Confederacy itself." (p. 4)

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The five original tribes that united to create the Iroquois Confederacy were the Mohawks, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga and the Seneca. The Tuscarora nation joined the Confederacy in 1715 after being expelled from its territory in North Carolina after losing a war with another tribe. The Iroquois Confederacy was created at some point in the fifteenth or sixteenth century after many years of warfare among the five tribes weakened the tribes, leaving them vulnerable to attack and predation by enemies. Political fragmentation led to military weakness. According to Richard Worth, author of "The Rise and Fall of the Iroquois Confederacy," "Sometime between 1450 and 1600, representatives from each tribe met together and decided to bury their war clubs under a great tree of peace." Each tribe was given varying percentages of 50 seats on the Grand Council filled by male leaders known as "sachems." "Before war could be declared, all the members of the Grand Council had to agree. Important decisions, like going to war, had to be reached by consensus, not majority rule." 

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Sachems were a unifying force in the Confederacy in that they were invested in political structures and processes that aspired to consensus and required patient deliberation among leaders before taking action that affected the welfare of all members of the Confederacy. The women of the tribes selected the sachems, "who succeeded through the female head of the clan, and they had the power to impeach and remove them from office." Women also "kept the clan members true to their values and interests and provided oversight over the affairs of each village." (Worth, p. 14).  

 

Political unification of the five founding tribes of the Confederacy increased their collective military power and led to war with tribes that had defeated them in past years, including the Adirondacks and the Hurons. "This war lasted over fifty years and near its end drew the newly arrived French into the conflict ... " (Schrader, p. 15).  War is a common outcome of successful political unification of a nation that strengthens the sense of collective identity and, in turn, further enhances social cohesion when war leads to the defeat of a common enemy.

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 Sharing in the "spoils of war" is a powerful unifying factor in all societies. During the 1600s,  the tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy suffered a huge loss of population through infectious disease spread by contact with the English and French and other Europeans. One of the Confederacy's goals of nearly constant warfare with tribal enemies was to replenish their declining populations, as well as to exact revenge for the deaths of warriors and other tribal members killed in war.  According to Schrader, " The Iroquois considered any non-allied nation as an enemy."  (p. 17)

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Given their proclivity for war and the degree of independence afforded leaders of war parties in various tribes, the Confederacy struggled to maintain unity of purpose in military affairs. Schrader asserts: " In order to assume better supervision on the "affairs of war," the Seneca Nation assumed two additional hereditary chieftaincy positions to act as supreme military chieftains for the Confederation," with the goal of achieving unified purpose and effort in war. This goal became increasingly difficult to achieve as contacts of tribes with French and English populations increased across the Confederacy. During the last years of the Confederacy, i.e., the period of the American revolution, the six tribes could not agree on a common enemy and ended up fighting one another.  The inability of political elites to reach agreement about enemies is an indicator of social fragmentation and a cause of further fragmentation. This was the fate and final undoing of the Iroquois Confederacy.  

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However, for much of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Iroquois were viewed by European settlers as a powerful, virtually impregnable military force. Near constant warfare increased the tribes' social cohesion in multiple ways. Schrader writes: "Throughout the entire ritual of war, the whole village took part in the activity, which promoted strong group cohesion." (p. 18) Repeated victory in war enhanced the pride and  sense of superiority of tribal members.  Victory in war often leads to a feeling of divine approbation and a belief that a society is special and has been "chosen" to be dominant by the gods or God. 

 

The Iroquois were understandably proud of their culture and political structure, which was so difficult to create and maintain. The Iroquois were led by three groups: the civil chiefs, i.e., sachems, as discussed above, the clan matrons and the lesser chiefs.  In theory, the tribes had an equal voice, though in practice this was not always the case. In war, the Senecas, the tribe at the west of the Confederacy, had the greatest influence because they were often the first to confront invading tribes or Europeans. 

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Clan matrons exercised great influence, in part because the Iroquois were a matrilineal society, and  because most able-bodied men were frequently absent from villages due to interminable wars. Clan matrons managed the internal affairs of villages and controlled their individual clans. Clan matrons decided whether to adopt or free captives, and they could remove a sachem from office. They also played a role in diplomacy, according to Schrader.

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The "lesser chiefs" included talented men who distinguished themselves in war or oratory; the position was not hereditary. Lesser chiefs had an interest in pursuing war because this was a major way they gained prestige and  influence. Iroquois society  was organized to share power among these sachems, clan matrons and lesser chiefs,  and, like all such power sharing arrangements, was a difficult balancing act.  

The political culture of the Iroquois was to strive for unanimity in major decisions, regardless of the time required to achieve this goal. The Iroquois did not employ the idea of majority rule and minority rights. "This meant that all sachems within a tribe must obtain complete unanimity prior to casting their nation's vote in the Great Council." (Schrader, p. 22) For this reason, skill in oratory was highly valued and was another way a talented young man might become a lesser chief. In addition, personal qualities such as generosity, responsibility, imperturbability and willingness to compromise were a source of personal influence, Schrader states. (p. 22)

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Like all societies, the Iroquois struggled with factions. "All levels experienced these factions, from clan level all the way to the Great Council," ( p. 23) Schrader states. He asserts that, for many years, the Iroquois were able to eventually arrive at unanimous decisions on important issues, though not without lengthy delays. They considered hasty decision making as inherently bad, i.e. "as lacking genuineness." (p. 23) However, "when decisions couldn't be made, divisions would widen between the different factions." (p. 24) According to Schrader, prior to 1763 there were two main sources of division: 1) the division between adherents of traditional spiritual practices and beliefs and Christians and 2) the division between Francophiles and Anglophiles. These sources of division became increasingly difficult to reconcile and led to cultural fragmentation that preceded political fragmentation.     

 

Contact of the Iroquois with French and English settlers was a disruptive influence for several reasons:  European settlers had technology that the Iroquois lacked, including muskets, metal hoes and scissors and needles and thread for sewing, European clothing such as vests and coats, as well as jewelry and scarlet handkerchiefs designed for Native women. The Iroquois obtained these items through the fur trade, which they dominated for many decades.  Worth states: “As the colonial traders and officials provided gifts to the tribes, the demand for them only continued to grow. ... (the consumer economy) began to corrupt and undermine the culture of the Iroquois. Liquor became especially insidious and damaging. ... Liquor changed the Iroquois culture just like the other consumer items introduced by the European traders. Once the Iroquois became dependent on these goods, there was no going back. “ (p. 51)  

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The Iroquois were drawn into complex, ever changing relationships with English, Dutch and French traders and these countries’ military forces that led to recurrent internal conflict within and among tribes of the Confederacy. Some of these conflicts were over religion. Schrader states: “Many Iroquois believed that by adopting Christianity, the Iroquois would lose their national identity and take on European identity.” (p. 27) In the view of traditionalists, “any Iroquois who became a Christian meant that he or she ceased to be Iroquois ...” ( p. 29) Christian missionaries sometimes prohibited converts from practicing tribal customs, which isolated them from other tribal members, Schrader asserts. “Within the Confederacy, Iroquois Catholic converts became French in the eyes of traditionalists and potentially their enemies." (p. 30) The influence of Christianity was especially strong among the Mohawks, according to Schrader.  At the urging of missionaries,  approximately 20-30% of the Mohawks moved to a village close to New France by the 1680s, Schrader states.

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France and England struggled for dominance in North America throughout the 1600s and most of the 1700s until England’s victory over the French in 1763. Both sides sought to win the support of the Iroquois through gift giving and military alliances, but for the most part the Iroquois took a neutral stance in the wars between the French and English. However, the Mohawks had a history of conflict with the French while the Seneca were occasionally allies of the French. The Iroquois controlled a large part of the Northeastern U.S., with the result that the tribes of the Confederacy had somewhat different experiences with these imperial powers, e.g. the Seneca had far more contact with New France than the Mohawks.  There were periods when one or two tribes were allied in war with either the French or English, while the other tribes remained neutral, Schrader asserts. He comments: “Even if the tribes supported different sides (i.e., French or English), the Confederacy maintained its unity as long as these tribes maintained their reciprocal relationships between them.” ( p. 38)

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Schrader maintains that after 1763, the year the last French and Indian War ended with an English victory, everything changed: “”After 1763, the centripetal forces that strengthened the Iroquois center of gravity (CoG) of its national identity started to disappear. “ Both loss of population and European expansion “pulled the six nations apart.”  ( p. 44) Schrader estimates that the Iroquois lost half of their population from 1600 to 1700, while Worth asserts that the Iroquois suffered a loss of 90% of their population, from 100,000 at peak in the seventeenth century to 10,000-12,000 in the late eighteenth century.  In contrast, the population of English settlers increased from a quarter of a million in 1720 to about two million in 1760. (Worth, p. 52)

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The large increase of English settlers and the loss of population among the Iroquois led to persistent encroachment of settlers on Iroquois land, especially on territory controlled by the Mohawks, the eastern most tribe of the Confederacy. The Iroquois responded by expanding its territory westward into the Delaware, Susquehanna River and Ohio Valleys. According to Worth, “ … the Iroquois had become the overlords of another group of Native Americans, known as the Delaware who lived along the Lehigh Rivers.” (p. 59-60) The Iroquois ceded control of Delaware lands to Pennsylvania and lands in the Ohio Valley to divert settlers from Iroquois lands further East. In the short run, “This enabled the Iroquois to reap huge rewards from the English colonies and enhance their position as power brokers,” Worth asserts. It also convinced other tribes in the Ohio Valley that the Iroquois could not be trusted and must be resisted at all costs.  There would be no further expansion of the Confederacy beyond the six tribes, even as the power of French and English forces greatly increased in the mid-eighteenth century.   

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Schrader comments that the Iroquois loss of population through war and (mainly) disease not only reduced the Confederacy’s military strength but also had negative effects on its political culture. In particular, the loss of sachems “weakened this group whose main purpose involved maintaining the peace within the Confederacy.” ( p. 47) In addition, because of the loss of knowledgeable teachers, “the people lost much of their national identity.” ( p. 48) The Iroquois replenished their population with “adoptees,” i.e. people who were conquered by the Iroquois or lived on land controlled by the Confederacy. Schrader states that “many observers believed that by the late seventeenth century, adopted peoples outnumbered the native Iroquois.” ( p. 48)

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The victory of the British in the last (and decisive) French and Indian War greatly reduced the power of the Iroquois who could no longer play the English against the French and allowed colonial governments to devote more of their military resources to bringing tribes  standing in the way of expanded colonial settlement under control. In addition, Schrader maintains that, after 1750, British governments demonstrated increased skill and understanding of how to manage their relationship with the Confederacy by bringing diplomatic, economic and military power to bear in concert. In contrast, the loss of sachems led to faction fights and diminished leadership capacity among the Iroquois, Schrader maintains. 

  

There were influential leaders among the Iroquois, e.g. Joseph and Molly Brandt, who were pro-British during the American Revolution. Schrader states:  “by 1777, a significant percentage of the Confederacy, to include the entire Seneca nation, supported the British. The majority of the Oneida and the Tuscarora’s supported the Americans.” (p. 74) At the Battle of Oriskany on August 6, 1777, the Seneca and the British fought the Americans and their Oneida allies (p. 74).  This battle, Schrader states, led to a desire for revenge on both sides. In 1780, “The pro-British Iroquois attacked many American villages  to the east, along with their allies, the Oneidas and Tuscarora’s,”  Schrader writes. (p. 75)

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Schrader asserts that Iroquois disunity during the American revolution was the culmination of a long period of cultural decline. “ … by the early 1700s the Iroquois culture weakened the unity of command and effort among the Confederacy.” ( p. 76) Factionalism increased while the social norm of reciprocity and mutual support was increasingly ignored, Schrader maintains. Over time, European settlers who, for more than a hundred years, had great difficulty in coping with the Iroquois Confederacy became dominant. After the American Revolution, the divided Confederacy was incapable of resisting the westward expansion of land hungry colonial settlers. “The once powerful Confederacy broke into a series of small reservations,” Schrader states. ( p. 77)

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Schrader has exceptional insight regarding how a Native American society capable of creating a robust form of democracy in order to defend itself, expand its territorial scope and effectively cope with colonial settlements of three imperial powers (England, France and the Netherlands) could gradually lose its sense of identity and be undermined by internal factions. However, he does not do justice to the predicament confronting the Iroquois from the late seventeenth century through the American Revolution, i.e. the last hundred years of the Confederacy. The Iroquois, like other Native American tribes, were decimated by population loss while the European population dramatically increased to two to three million people, many of whom were land hungry and unwilling to respect any agreement with tribes entered into by political leaders.  From the early 1700’s, it must have been obvious to Iroquois leaders that either the English or French, with their superior technology and growing populations, would eventually be able to militarily crush the Confederacy. However, as late as the 1750s, it was not obvious which imperial power would prevail. For this reason, most (but not all) of the Iroquois tribes strove to remain neural during the last of the French and Indian wars.

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Following England’s victory in this war, it must have seemed apparent that the Confederacy would have to accommodate the power of the British, and several influential Iroquois leaders became strong Anglophiles. However, the American Revolution put this assessment to the test. Neutrality became impossible. The Confederacy had to make an existential choice in that to be on the losing side was to risk everything. Initially, supporters of the British might have felt that they had made the smart bet. England had a powerful Navy, a disciplined army and a history of mercilessly crushing rebellion in India. The Americans were disorganized, in political disarray, without a reliable means of financially supporting its citizen militias and seemingly lacking competent military leadership.

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What would have happened to the Iroquois Confederacy if the British had crushed the American rebels at the beginning of hostilities, as seemed likely at the time? Any answer to this question is speculation of course. My guess is that the dismantling of the Confederacy would have been delayed by a decade or two, but not much longer due to the insatiable land hunger of colonial settlers. Any government would have eventually given in to settler encroachment on Iroquois land for the same reason the state of Israel is unable and unwilling to stop attacks on Palestinians who live on the West Bank. Though some political leaders might want the settlers to stop their attacks, the Israeli government is unwilling to  repeatedly use lethal force or detention against Israeli perpetrators of these attacks, therefore fait accompli.

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On a more abstract level, the history of the Iroquois Confederacy suggests lessons regarding war and its relation to social cohesion and fragmentation. The Confederacy became united to stop wars among its tribes and to effectively conduct war against its enemies. War is the mother of nations, and its conduct usually wards off political fragmentation, especially when a nation is victorious in war. Thus the saying, “in war, nothing succeeds like success.” The Iroquois fought nearly interminable wars for two hundred years to control valuable resources, e.g., the fur trade, to create borderlands between its main territories and powerful enemies, and also to maintain tribal unity.

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It is not an aggressive instinct that makes war so endemic among human societies. Rather it is the usefulness of a powerful enemy for resisting persistent tendencies to political fragmentation that fuels war fever. A nation organized to defeat a feared and hated enemy can ignore its own divisions, at least for a period of time. However, losing a war can bring down governments or even forms of government; and following victory, it’s likely that internal differences will soon bring political tensions to a boil. Human beings utilize the dynamic of Us vs. Them to develop and strengthen social identity. Nations and empires will always find an enemy to fear and hate.

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(More elements in this series to follow)