DEE WILSON CONSULTING

This article, “The fragmentation of empires and emerging nationalisms in the Balkans, 1804-1923,” is the second in a series, “Unity and fragmentation in tribes, nations and empires.”  The initial article was about the Iroquois Confederacy.

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This article is about southeastern Europe and its multiple ethnic groups, including Greeks, Slavs, Croats, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Albanians and regions, including Bosnia, Serbia, Rumeli, Moldavia, Wallachia, Silistre, Montenegro, and Macedonia as they were organized under the Ottoman empire during the early years of the nineteenth century.  

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By 1800, the Ottoman Empire had ruled the Balkans, i.e., “Turkey in Europe,” for centuries. In The Balkans, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, (2000), Misha Glenny asserts that religion was the primary basis of social identity in the Ottoman Empire.  Muslims were privileged; Christians were second class citizens who lacked equality under law.  Glenny states that “At the start of the nineteenth century, national consciousness was probably weaker on the Balkan peninsula than anywhere else in Europe.” (p. xxvi) Nationalism in the Balkans, hardly a factor in peasant revolts against Ottoman rule during the early years of the nineteenth century, became associated with the insistence of Christian communities, themselves divided, for equal rights with Muslims and eventually with multiple revolutionary movements determined to achieve independence from Ottoman rule. 

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Glenny describes a process of identity formation in the Balkans that used “confessional affiliation,” i.e., Christians vs. Muslims, as a starting point, but which quickly fractured due to divisions among Christian churches as well as differences in languages, social and economic considerations, “and by the construction of historical myths.”

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Emerging nationalisms in the Balkans were (as elsewhere) very much an imaginative creation.  National identity was not simply reflective of historical facts or geography; rather historical events, especially wars and other violent conflicts, were woven into imaginative narratives developed by intellectuals, political leaders and others to create national identities. 

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Glenny states: “At first, the young national movements aimed to undermine or even bring down the great oppressor, the Sultan, his bureaucrats and his generals. But migratory patterns in the Empire had been fluid for almost five hundred years. Conversion to Islam had also divided ethnic communities. ... There were Muslims who only spoke Slav or Greek, in many areas Greeks, Turks, Albanians, Jews and Slavs lived together, sometimes mixing with one another, sometimes remaining isolated. ... Given this complexity, it was likely that the emerging nations would no longer need to fight the imperial oppressor but would turn against one another.“ (pp. 93-94)  

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Emerging nationalisms in the Balkans were not based solely on geography, ethnicity, religion or language.  They had to confront complex and confusing combinations of these disparate identities. 

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The Ottoman Empire slowly unraveled over more than century of struggles with peasant uprisings, revolts and wars of national liberation after determined efforts to crush challenges to their rule, and only after the interventions of the Russia and Austrian- Hungarian empires on several occasions. Initially, Ottoman rulers and generals crushed, or attempted to crush, peasant revolts in Serbia with ferocious cruelty, an Ottoman trademark that mirrored the cruelty of earlier empires (Roman, Spanish, Mongols) in Europe and around the world.  Following the defeat of First Serbian Uprising in 1913, the new Governor, Suleyman Pasa, responded to continued opposition of Serbian peasants with the following: 

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“Men were roasted alive, hanged by their feet over smoking straw until they asphyxiated, castrated, crushed with stones, and bastinadoed. Their women and children were raped and sometimes taken by force to harems ... Outside Stambul Gate in Belgrade, there were always on view the corpses of impaled Serbs being gnawed by packs of dogs.” (p. 19)

 

One needs to look no further than the Ottoman Empire’s response to armed resistance to understand the numerous atrocities committed by armies and citizen militias against both soldiers and civilians during armed conflict in the Balkans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Groups who had been treated cruelly by Ottoman armies and officials for centuries learned to be cruel in return, not just in fighting Ottoman armies but in civil conflicts as well.

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George Finlay, whom Glenny describes as “the first great historian of modern Greece and a committed philhellene,” “was nonetheless appalled by the behavior of the Greek rebels” during the sacking of Tripoli, which occurred during the 1820’s Greek War of Independence:

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“Human beings can rarely have perpetrated so many deeds of cruelty on an equal number of their fellow creatures as were

perpetrated on this occasion ...  Women and children were frequently tortured before they were murdered.  After the Greeks had been in possession of the city for forty- eight hours, they deliberately collected together about two thousand persons of every age and sex, but principally women and children, and led them to a ravine in the nearest mountain where they murdered every soul.” (p. 29)

 

Tens of thousands of Muslim citizens (not soldiers) died in “a series of uncontrolled massacres,” during the sacking of Tripoli, according to Glenny. 

It took three decades for Ottoman rulers and elites to learn that multiple Balkan revolts and widespread resistance to Ottoman rule could not be crushed solely by military force, however effectively applied in specific conflicts.  The Ottomans attempted to develop “a supranational identity,” Ottomanism, supported by legal and administrative reforms in 1839 and 1856 which “confirmed the equality of all the Sultan’s subjects, regardless of the millet to which they belonged.  It thus implicitly denied the superiority of Islam” (p. 91), Glenny asserts. 

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Not surprisingly, these reforms led to great discontent among many Muslims who felt that granting equality under law to Christians and other minorities living in the Empire was an infringement of their “sacred rights,” Glenny states. 

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Ottomanism as a cultural identity “had to compete with a powerful alternative from abroad -- the victory of unifying nationalisms in Italy and Germany.  The Christians of the Empire inevitably sought to emulate the Italians and Germans” ( p. 90), Glenny asserts. 

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The flowering of nationalism in nineteenth century Europe

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Some historians view the French Revolution and its aftermath, especially Napoleon’s conquest of most of Europe, as the spark that led to the flowering of nationalism in Europe and other parts of the world, e.g., South America. In The Rule of Empires (2010), Timothy Parsons states that “Napoleon conquered most of the continent by harnessing the emerging power of French nationalism ..., but like other empire builders “Extraction and exploitation were still the defining realities of imperial subject-hood, and no amount of ... benevolently nationalistic rhetoric could disguise this fact. “ ( p. 233) Parsons comments that initial resistance to Napoleonic rule outside France “fell back on localism,” i.e. identification with local communities or groups, but communities “gradually found common cause in resisting an oppressive imperial regime.”   However, “it would take time for intellectuals and politicians to enlist or conscript the peoples of Europe in nation building.” (p. 235) Parsons believes that nation-building, even in its early stages, “closed up the social divisions that empire builders needed to recruit the local allies that made long term-rule possible.”  (p. 235) 

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All empires depend on an ideology that justifies their domination and exploitation of subject populations. Parsons asserts: “Napoleon never forgot that at its core his empire was fundamentally French.  Although he was born on Corsica, he recognized the value of French cultural confidence as a potent imperial tool.” (p. 237) In 1805, Napoleon directed his brother, Eugene, not to tolerate Italian resistance to French rule. Napoleon reportedly said to Eugene: 

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        “There is evil in (Italians). Do not let them forget that I am the master and can do whatever I wish. This needs to be drummed into all 

         peoples, but especially the Italians, who only obey the voice of a master.” (p. 239)

 

It is the insufferable arrogance of rulers and administrators of empires that ensures they will eventually meet fierce, often violent resistance from oppressed populations.  It is one thing for a population to be economically exploited by a powerful empire; but it’s salt in the wound to be treated as inferior, hardly worthy of notice or concern.  For this reason (and others), all empires eventually receive their comeuppance.

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Emerging nationalisms in the Balkans and elsewhere in the nineteenth century were an effective antidote to demeaning attitudes and beliefs of empires’ ruling elites regarding subject populations.  Furthermore, as national identities flowered throughout Europe, they became associated with demands for representative governance, i.e. for elected leaders whose role was to check the overreach of autocrats.  Eventually, these aspirations would lead to popular uprisings in multiple countries in 1848, uprisings that came close to turning European political institutions upside down before being crushed by resurgent autocracies in several countries. 

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New Balkan nations vs. the Ottoman Empire, 1830- 1912   

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The Ottoman Empire did not easily or quickly relinquish its power in the Balkans. Glenny states:

 

“Having lost a substantial chunk of its European territory in the Greek War of Independence, the Ottoman Empire was determined to milk both the Principalities and Serbia within the framework of their new autonomous status.” (p. 60). 

 

However, as Ottoman ability to control Balkan territories that had won a degree of autonomy diminished, the Austrian and Russian empires greatly increased their influence, both commercially through trade and militarily.  Russia, in particular, viewed the waning of Ottoman power as a golden opportunity to incorporate some parts of the Balkans, e.g. Romania and Serbia, into its sphere of influence. 

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In addition, Ottoman armies periodically defeated undisciplined peasant armies that broke and ran when confronted by an experienced and disciplined army.  Glenny comments that newly formed Balkan nations found that to survive military conflicts with Ottoman armies they needed a Great Power sponsor, i.e., either Austria- Hungary or Russia.  As the nineteenth century progressed, the Balkans became a central focus of Great Power conflicts between and among three empires, Ottoman, Austria - Hungarian and Russian, for control of the Balkans.  These Great Power conflicts, along with the rise of Germany, eventually led to W.W. I , an unprecedented “total war” of choice that required the mobilization of entire nations and which ultimately destroyed all three empires. 

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W.W. I, which began a month after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, by a Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, was unexpected in that, for several decades, periodic crises in the Balkans had been resolved without war. The 1878 Congress of Berlin grappled with the Great Eastern Crisis resulting from the gradual loss of Ottoman power in the Balkans and the ambitions of Austria- Hungary and Russia to fill the power vacuum left by the imminent demise of “Turkey in Europe.” Glenny comments: “The Balkan peninsula was a tangled mess. It had become a laboratory for political change where grand diplomats and impecunious elites tinkered with collapsing authority, local folk traditions, novel nationalist ideologies and, above all, their own short- term interests to create a jagged constitutional and territorial montage.” (pp. 139-40)     

The Congress of Berlin was chaired and dominated by Bismark, the German Chancellor.  Glenny writes that “the Chancellor had only one foreign policy goal -- to maintain a balance of power which would block the formation of an anti- German alliance.”   (p. 143) To this end, “The Congress of Berlin subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan states to three expanding spheres of influence -- Austro- Hungarian, Russian and British.” (p. 144) The Ottoman empire was stripped of much of its Balkan territories but left in nominal control of some, and had Macedonia and Thrace restored to its control.  Serbia, Romania and Montenegro were granted full independence.  Austria - Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina. Bulgaria’s land area was reduced by half. 

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The partition of the Balkans by the Congress of Berlin dissatisfied all parties, Glenny states, even the big winners, and practically guaranteed future conflicts.  Most importantly, the Ottoman Empire was further weakened without being expelled from southeastern Europe. The Congress made clear that Great Powers, i.e. large empires, still had the decisive say regarding the fate of emerging nations, which remained true until 1913 when, during the second Balkan War, Serbia and Greece attacked Bulgaria and took territory given to Bulgaria after the First Balkan War of 1912, the brief war that finally expelled the Ottoman Empire from Europe. 

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In Pandora’s Box: A History of the First World War (2018), the German historian, Jorn Leonard, comments:

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 “The significance of the Balkan wars for the prehistory of the world war can hardly be overstated; they maintained the dynamic of violence and counter-violence that had marked the region since the early modern wars of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.”  (p. 49)

 

The relatively new nations of the Balkans had learned from their struggles with the Ottomans and the disregard of their interests displayed by the Congress of Berlin that great empires and powerful nations respected military power above all and were ready to dismember small nations that could not defend themselves. Emerging nations which arose in opposition to the arbitrary power of empires became committed to strengthening their militaries and acting in a predatory way to increase their size and influence.  

 

European leaders and pundits did not expect another Balkan crisis resulting from a political assassination to lead to a world war. Crisis in 1908 caused by Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia- Hercegovina and the Balkan wars of 1912-13 had been contained by diplomacy and/or quick decisive battles. Why should another crisis in the Balkans be any different? The difference was that leaders of Austria - Hungary felt that their empire was existentially threatened by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand due to Serbia’s complicity in the murder. How could an empire be maintained if a small country such as Serbia could be instrumental in the murder of the heir to the Habsburg throne without consequences?  

Jorn asserts that war in the Balkans did not end with Armistice in November 1918.  He maintains there was no clear demarcation in the Balkans between war and non-war from 1918-1923.  Jorn maintains that after the war “the character of nationalism became associated with a culture of violent empowerment.” ( p. 898) And: following the war, “full-fledged nationalist horizons took shape, especially in the societies of the multinational empires.” (p. 903) Furthermore, multiple parties, nations and factions engaged in “attempts to legitimize violence by reference to the right of self-defense,” which has become in the modern era an all-purpose excuse for war crimes, including torture and genocide, committed by powerful nations.   

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There is a lesson in the history of the Balkans regarding the likely consequences of the dissolution of long-lasting empires, such as the Ottoman Empire: the longer an empire rules a large area of the world and the more oppressive and cruel its practices in maintaining power, the greater the degree of post- empire fragmentation and difficulty in developing new forms of political unity. Wars that included attacks on civilian populations, massacres of unarmed soldiers and citizens and ethnic cleansing and other war crimes occurred in the Balkans during the 1990’s.  

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Glenny argues that the interventions of great powers in the Balkans in 1878 (Congress of Berlin), 1914 and 1940 (following Italy’s attack of Greece) “were so destructive that they guaranteed the Balkans’ relative economic backwardness ... And the violence that these interventions encouraged, often inflicted by one Balkan people on another, ensured the continuation of civil and nationalist strife.” (p. 661) She continues: “The NATO assault on Serbia and Kosovo should be judged above all in this light. Should the West fail to address the effects, not merely of a three-month air war in 1999, but of 120 years of miscalculation and indifference since the Congress of Berlin, then there will be little to distinguish NATO’s actions from any of its great power predecessors. (p. 662) 

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Timothy Parsons asserts that “Nationalism played a central role in destroying the world’s last formal empires,” (p. 449) but in doing so ( I believe) created a powerful historical wake of violence and injustice. Parsons writes: “Empires were never humane, and imperial subject-hood was always demeaning and intolerable,” a rule that applies to short lived empires, e.g. U.S. control of the Philippines, as well as long lasting empires such as the British Raj in India.  How any thoughtful person could accuse Balkan countries of unusual “blood thirstiness” after the horrendous bloodletting on both the eastern and western fronts during W.W. I, the merciless bombing of cities by Germany and the Allies during W.W. II, as well as Japanese atrocities committed against civilian populations in Asia, is hard to understand.  Still, following W.W. II all of Europe except the Balkans created a political order devoid of wars between nations on the European continent that had occurred frequently for at least a thousand years. What was different about Balkan nations that explains their inability to do the same? Answer: centuries of rule by the Ottoman Empire. 

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Leonard comments: “What had begun in Summer 1914 as essentially an interstate war branched out in 1917 into new forms of violence ... that lasted far beyond the formal end of the war in the west: wars of independence, nation-building wars, ethnic conflicts, and civil wars. ... For eastern and southeastern Europe, it was more the period stretching from the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908 through the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 to the peace of Lausanne in 1923 that constituted a relative unity.” ( p. 893) Nationalisms that flowered in Europe as a challenge to empires and to autocracy became enmeshed with predatory violence justified as necessary to build and sustain nations.  

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References

Glenny, G., The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (2000), Penguin Books, New York, NY. 

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Leonard, J., Pandora’s Box: A History of the First World War (2018), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 

Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. 

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Parsons, T., The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall

(2010), Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

 

More articles in this series

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© Dee Wilson

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